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DISPUTE OR MEDIATOR? THE SELECTION 
AND EFFECTIVENESS OF CONFLICT MANAGEMENT 
IN CIVIL WARS1
A discrepancy in international conflict management lies in the varying explanations 
offered by those trying to mediate a peaceful ending to a militarized conflict. When 
an attempt to reach a settlement fails, they contend that the intractable nature of the 
conflict prevented opposing parties from reaching an agreement. In the event of a suc-
cessful outcome, conversely, the mediator statements often shift from blaming others 
to emphasizing their own strategies, skills, and trustworthiness. In September 1992, 
U.S. Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger for instance justified the passive stance 
of the Bush administration by claiming: “Until the Bosnians, Serbs and Croats decide 
to stop killing each other, there is nothing the outside world can do about it” (Danner, 
1997). No such fatalism characterized the speech in which President Clinton described 
the pivotal role NATO and the U.S. had played in the conclusion of the Dayton Agree-
ment, where he stated that, “Without us, the hard-won peace would be lost [...]” (Kuy-
pers, 1997: 77).
The literature on mediation in militarized conflicts reflects these conflicting inter-
pretations of the ability of mediators to successfully convince the warring parties to 
end their conflict. The structural perspective, which assesses the macro-level conditions 
under which mediation occurs, sees the conflict dynamics (Bercovitch, Langley, 1993; 
Kathman, 2011) and the nature of a specific rivalry (Goertz, Diehl, 1997) or regime (Dix-
on, 1993) as the main barrier to peace. A second approach, the individualist approach, 
stresses a mediator’s identity, skills, and beliefs. In this viewpoint, it is especially the re-
lationship between a mediator and the warring parties that allegedly foster the conclusion 
of an agreement (see e.g. Bercovitch, Schneider, 2000; Svensson, 2007).
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This article tries to reconcile individual and structural explanations of conflict man-
agement occurrence and success. Drawing on the bargaining theory of war (Wagner, 
2000, Powell, 2012), we develop a synthesis of these different theories and ask: Which 
conflict characteristics influence the success of mediation, and what sort of mediation 
strategy helps the warring parties to conclude a peace agreement?
Our argument conceives of mediation as a sequential, but integrated process (Wall, 
Stark, Standifer, 2001) in which at least three important decisions precede a possible 
peace agreement: 1) the selection of mediation as a way to resolve the conflict, 2) the 
choice of a particular conflict manager, and, lastly, 3) the decision by the mediating 
party to opt for a particular strategy. This means that we should start with an examina-
tion of mediation occurrence and strategy selection by the mediator (see also Beard-
sley, 2011: 45). We contend that, while the structural attributes of the conflict mainly 
influence the adaptation of mediation, individual features of the mediator affect the 
last two phases of the conflict management attempt: the choice of a particular conflict 
management strategy, and the final outcome. Our adaptation of the bargaining theory 
of war (Wagner, 2000; Powell, 2012) suggests that warring parties carefully select 
a mediator who will only be able to use decisive strategies if they allow the conflict 
manager to do so or if they underestimate its ability to change the status quo. The first 
perspective suggests that the usage of mediation strategy is determined by the conflict 
and the evolving balance of power between the disputants. Individual strategies can in 
line with the second viewpoint only become effective if the disputants underestimate 
the mutually chosen or accepted mediator. We henceforth expect that what we call 
decisive strategies make a difference when the warring parties did not expect such an 
intrusion or when they saw less interventionist mediation fail in previous attempts by 
outside parties to bring peace to a violent conflict. Decisive strategies comprise in oth-
er words what Bercovitch (1991) “procedural” and “directive” measures. They move 
beyond the communication facilitation that less powerful communication facilitators 
provide or that are tried out in a first conflict management attempt.
The empirical evaluation of our synthesizing argument of the structural and indi-
vidual perspectives is based on the Civil War Mediation (CWM) dataset (DeRouen 
et al., 2011). This source exclusively focuses on civil war mediation in the period 
from 1945 to 2004, and provides detailed information on mediated and non-me-
diated conflicts. Heckman probit regressions show that mediated conflicts are not 
a random sample of all civil wars examined, and that especially intensive conflicts 
and conflicts with a “hurting stalemate” are more likely to experience this sort of 
voluntary conflict management. However, the outcome of mediations is not only 
determined by the structure of the conflict alone. The analysis reveals that decisive 
strategies and multilateral mediations are more effective even if we control for the 
selection effects.
The data also shows that mediations initiated by a third party are more likely to 
fail than conflict management proposals by the belligerents. This finding indicates 
that the hands of mediators are often tied and that their decisive strategies only make 
a difference when the forward-looking warring parties did not expect the mediator to 
act effectively. Directive strategies are effective in leading to the conclusion of peace 
agreements not only because of their virtues but also because they can build on previ-
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ous mediation efforts. With respect to other mediation attributes, such as the identity 
of the mediator and the location (territory) where the mediation takes place, we find 
that they do not systematically increase the chance of peace process to be concluded 
in form of the agreement.
UNDERSTANING THE PHASES OF MEDIATION
Most militarized disputes since 1945 have experienced some type of conflict man-
agement, with mediation and bilateral negotiations being the most popular mecha-
nisms (Bercovitch, Fretter, 2007: 149). The particular mechanism this article stud-
ies is mediation, which Bercovitch, Anagnoson and Wille (1991: 8) define as “[...] 
a process of conflict management where disputants seek the assistance of, or accept 
an offer of help from, an individual, group, state or organization to settle their con-
flict or resolve their differences without resorting to physical force or invoking the 
authority of the law”.2
Mediation therefore represents a non-violent third party intervention, and encom-
passes a wide range of strategies and tactics that are all aimed at resolving the conflict 
at hand (Terris, Maoz, 2005: 563–566; Beber, 2012: 5; Regan, Aydin, 2006: 739–740). 
The third party can choose the sites for the mediation, chair the meetings, convey pro-
posals and directly influence the conflict management attempt through persuasive- and 
pressure tactics to entice the warring parties to reach an agreement.
Bercovitch et al. (1991) developed a trichotomy that categorizes mediation strate-
gies according to their strength into (1) directive, (2) procedural, and (3) communica-
tion facilitation strategies, with the first two considered to be more decisive. A direc-
tive strategy is the most powerful form of intervention, as the third party can shape 
the content and nature of a final outcome either by promising support or by threaten-
ing actors with diplomatic sanctions or other coercive measures. Conversely, a proce-
dural strategy enables the mediator to control the conflict management environment. 
Lastly, communication facilitation encompasses relatively passive tactics that range 
from providing information to organizing talks between belligerents. Interventions by 
the United Nations, such as in Cambodia, Croatia, Georgia, Indonesia, Morocco, Mo-
zambique, and Tajikistan, often rely on a procedural strategy rather than communica-
tion facilitation. On the contrary, multilateral mediation teams often take a more timid 
stance; communication facilitation strategies were for instance used by the Organiza-
tion of the Islamic Conference (OIC) and a group of state mediators (Somalia, Senegal, 
Saudi Arabia, Indonesia) during the conflicts in the Philippines with MNLF/MILF in 
the 1970s and 1990s.
Drawing on the categorization by Bercovitch et al. (1991), we argue that such de-
cisive strategies can make a difference even if we account for the inability of some 
conflict managers to rely on such forceful tactics. Directive strategies are effective in 
leading to the conclusion of peace agreements, no only because of what they entail. 
As we will detail below, they can tip the scale if their usage was not expected or if 
2 The definition is widely acknowledged and commonly used in the literature (see DeRouen, 
Bercovitch, Pospieszna, 2011: 664 or Beardsley, 2008: 724).
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they build on previous mediation attempts. We join in this way an intensive scholarly 
debate about the factors that render mediation successful.3
Kleiboer (1996: 360) speaks of a quest for a “golden formula”, showing that the 
instruments, tactics and strategies chosen by the mediator play a particularly promi-
nent role among these potential drivers of mediation success.4 Despite this optimistic 
assessment, most studies that link conflict management success to mediation and me-
diator characteristics have come up with mixed results.
We contend in line with a growing literature that the success of mediation attempts 
can only be meaningfully assessed if we consider that mediations do not occur ran-
domly (Beber, 2012; Beardsley, 2011: 45; Clayton, 2015; Gartner, 2011; Svensson, 
2007), and that not all mediators have the same chance to rely on forceful media-
tion strategies (Bercovitch, Schneider, 2000). For example, only resourceful media-
tors can credibly rely on “settlement oriented” mediation, which requires considerable 
manipulations by the conflict manager, and which is therefore also called “directive” 
or “heavy.” According to Bercovitch (2011: 48), a mediator “may achieve this by us-
ing a combination of sticks and carrots, provision of incentives, offering rewards and 
punishments, issuing of ultimatums, and introduction of new proposals.” While this 
may drive promising results, some mediators cannot intervene in a determined fashion, 
meaning they must rely only on communication to facilitate the exchanges between 
the warring parties.
To understand the choice of mediation strategies and their impact, it is necessary 
to analyze why mediation occurs, and why certain mediators are chosen. A fruitful, 
yet pessimistic, starting point to do so is the neo-Clausewitzian bargaining theory of 
war. This approach, pioneered by Wagner (2000), expects that negotiations become 
more likely in a situation of a stalemate on the battlefield. As Powell (2012: 627) 
for instance writes, “the factions negotiate agreements and avoid fighting when the 
distribution of power is either completely stable or slowly changing.” Barring any 
misperception of the other side’s power, this perspective attributes peaceful ends 
to the power distribution of the contending forces. This means a mediation attempt 
will not systematically affect the chance of peace, irrespective of how skillful and 
determined a mediator may be.
If the warring parties are insincere in their mediation attempt and use the conflict 
management solely to buy time before returning to the fighting, the effort of a media-
tor remains equally inconsequential. As mediation is a voluntary process, no warring 
party will accept a mediator who is able to affect the power distribution in a negative 
way. In this perspective, effective mediation only becomes possible if at least one of 
the fighting groups underestimates the power of the mediator. This rational expecta-
tion perspective that mediation can only make a difference in a situation of uncertainty 
3 In this study we focus on short-term mediation success, which is typically defined through 
the conclusion of a peace treaty (Beardsely et al., 2006; Frazier, Dixon, 2006; Regan, Aydin, 2006; 
Walter, 2002; Wilkenfeld et al., 2003; Svensson, 2007; Rauchhaus, 2006). A long-term success, by 
contrast, is only possible if the parties to this formal or informal mediated agreement do not take up 
arms over an extended period.
4 The literature on this topic includes Bercovitch and Gartner (2009), Wilkenfeld et al. (2003), 
Maoz and Terris (2009), Beardsley et al. (2006), Svensson (2007).
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about the determination of the mediator is similar to the classic third party intervener 
paradox by Rubin (1980: 389), which finds that “[…] it is precisely when third-party 
intervention is likely to be needed most – when conflict is intense – that the anticipa-
tion of intervention may prove least helpful […].”
Despite this gloomy outlook, successful mediators nevertheless insist that their 
strategies made the crucial difference in turning a seemingly hopeless conflict man-
agement attempt into a success. Yet, decisive strategies are only used by mediators 
who can muster sufficient power to “convince” recalcitrant belligerents. For instance, 
IGOs are often only able to act as neutral, but nevertheless forceless go-betweens in 
their mediation attempts. According to Bercovitch (1992), regional and intergovern-
mental organizations’ primary resources are their expertise and legitimacy. Lacking 
the resources to encourage or discourage disruptive behavior, IGOs should naturally 
resort to communicative or procedural rather than directive strategies (see also Amoo, 
Zartman, 1992; Jonah, 1992). Similarly, Svensson (2009) finds that the UN is more 
restrictive with its promises, and is generally perceived as a more credible guarantor by 
disputants, which implies that it is more likely to use procedural or, to a lesser extent, 
communicative, rather than directive, strategies.
However, no scholarly consensus exists regarding which mediation strategy pre-
sumably works best. Zartman and Toub (1985), and Quinn et al. (2013) demonstrate 
empirically that “manipulative” conflict management can make a difference, while for-
mal models by Kydd (2003) and Rauchhaus (2006) outline the conditions under which 
even information provision to the disputants can lead to peaceful outcomes. Berco-
vitch and Houston (1993: 304) argue that directive strategies “help parties to save 
face, equalize power imbalances, and generally move the disputants toward a more 
cooperative orientation,” and Smith and Stam (2003: 128) further add that mediators 
cannot succeed by only acting as information providers.
Students of conflict management frequently assert that setting positive and neg-
ative incentives by a third party transforms the conflict dynamics. Beardsley et al. 
(2006: 81–83) emphasize, however, that facilitative strategies are the best possible 
answer to commitment problems and post-crisis tensions, while more intrusive forms 
of mediation seem to be redundant in such context. Beardsley (2011: 41) shows that 
manipulative mediation – what he calls “heavy-handed mediation” or “mediation with 
leverage” – may create temporary incentives for combatants to make peace, but resort-
ing to conflictive strategies will become attractive again once those artificial incentives 
are removed.
In the following section, we will address the controversy over the effectiveness of 
decisive strategies in conflict management. To do so, we advance the rational expecta-
tions framework outlined above that unites the structural and actor-centric perspec-
tive. We contend that warring parties select a mediator based on how conducive its 
anticipated conflict management strategy is to their own interest. If they are seriously 
seeking peace, they will strive for a consensus in finding a mediator who can help them 
finding an acceptable compromise. If, on the other hand, warring parties are simply 
trying to buy time, they will propose a weak conflict manager whose mission is bound 
to fail. The strategies adopted by a third party make in this perspective a difference if 
the belligerents underestimate the determination of a mediator.
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STRUCTURAL FACTORS
The neo-Clausewitzian literature on war as a bargaining process suggests that the 
decision of warring parties to request and accept the involvement of a third party 
depends on the chance to agree on a settlement that is more attractive than the payoff 
associated with continued fighting. The realized and anticipated costs of war are one 
of the key parameter in this decision making calculus. A considerable number of 
studies has highlighted that he number of casualties incurred can severely affect the 
actor’s willingness to engage in mediated talks and settling the conflict peacefully 
(e.g. Mason, Fett, 1996: 551). If there is a substantial loss to casualties, we could 
expect that the warring parties are more likely to initiate or accept mediation as 
a conflict management tool as they gradually realize that the losses are too large to 
continue fighting (e.g. Young, 1967).
However, Burton (1969) argues exactly the opposite; according to him, the higher 
the costs borne by each party, the more polarized their positions will be, rendering 
them more reluctant towards conflict management and mediation. Despite this, a grow-
ing blood trail serves to weaken leadership support from below. We therefore expect 
that warring parties are more likely to request and accept mediation when a conflict 
becomes more severe.
Another facet of costliness is war duration and conflict fatigue. Some analyses 
show that the chance of mediation increases with the length of a violent conflict (Greig, 
Diehl, 2006; Bercovitch, Jackson, 2001; Svensson, 2008). War-weariness may obviate 
the futility of military means, and therefore render combatants more willing to negoti-
ate (Zartman, 1989). Empirical studies show that territorial disputes trigger more often 
political violence, and that the conflicts which erupt over these issues, also last longer.5 
According to DeRouen et al. (2011), territorial wars are more likely to be mediated 
than governmental wars. However, such mediation attempts less often result in peace 
agreements. Furthermore, if an agreement can be made despite such constraints, these 
treaties additionally face a high risk of failure.6
Based on this reasoning, we contend that the intensity of a conflict also influenc-
es the chance that third parties employ decisive strategies. Bercovitch and Houston 
(2000) demonstrate that a mediator’s choice of strategy largely depends on the conflict 
and the needs of the parties involved. A similar logic applies to the effects of conflict 
intensity on the effectiveness of a mediation attempt. Acknowledging the possibility of 
selection effects, Bercovitch and Gartner (2006) establish that directive strategies will 
more likely be successful in in a low-intensity conflict than conflict-management that 
emphasizes communication.
Böhmelt (2010: 173) statistically takes the selection into account and shows that 
the relationship between the intensity of mediation in conflicts and its success is cur-
vilinear: “[…] both low and high intensity disputes are less likely to see interventions 
5 By definition governmental conflicts are fought over the control and orientation of the govern-
ment, while territorial conflicts are secessionist or autonomy-seeking wars (see http://www.pcr.uu.se/
research/ucdp/definitions/).
6 See for instance the studies by: Balch-Lindsay and Enterline, 2000; DeRouen, Bercovitch, 
2008; DeRouen et al., 2011.
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and effective outcomes.” Nevertheless, while mediation tends to work best before 
conflicts become very intense, conflicts must become heated enough for the warring 
parties to feel a need to find a resolution. Therefore, we advance the hypothesis that 
conflict intensity renders active mediation strategies more likely.
H1: High-intensity conflicts are more likely to encounter mediation as a conflict man-
agement instrument.
In addition to the aforementioned factors, the power of a country experiencing 
a civil war also influences its willingness to accept international mediators (Ber-
covitch, Schneider, 2000; Svensson, 2007). The power to withhold may stem from 
a membership in a military alliance. While pooling resources and decision-making 
capacities decreases the discretion of the national government, it can count on the sup-
port of fellow members in its resistance to the involvement of a third party. Leaders of 
powerful countries might equally be less willing to request external help and to accept 
external mediation as an international conflict management tool since they feel more 
capable of handling the conflict unilaterally. Thus, we argue that leaders of populous 
and internationally connected states are more likely to withstand offers to mediate in 
internal conflicts.
H2: More powerful war-torn countries are less likely to experience mediation.
Once warring parties agree on mediation and the possibly selected mediator ac-
cepts an offer to intervene, the conflict management officially starts. Some scholars ar-
gue that mediator characteristics are a major factor of effective mediation (e.g. Young, 
1968). Below, we will examine the attributes of mediators that may affect the choice 
of strategy and the success of the conflict management attempt.
MEDIATION CHARACTERISTICS AND THE SEQUENCING  
OF MEDIATION STRATEGIES
Our overarching theoretical argument suggests that both the conflict attributes and 
the power and strategies of the conflict manager matter in determining the outcome 
of mediation. Since potential mediators can reject an invitation to manage a conflict, 
they more likely accept if they feel they can derive some benefit from their interven-
tion (Bercovitch, Schneider, 2000; Greig, Regan, 2008: 762–765; Terris, Maoz, 2005: 
567–568). Regardless of whether a mediator is a state representative, IGO delegate or 
private individual, a main benefit of mediation success is a boost in prestige. Addition-
ally, state mediators might see a conflict management attempt as a means to nurture an 
existing alliance, to gain strategic influence, or to improve economic relations (Greig, 
Regan, 2008: 762–763).
Conversely, international organizations are often involved, as Touval (1994: 46; see 
also Bercovitch, Gartner, 2006) argues, in “orphaned conflicts,” which are intense and 
difficult to resolve. Engaging into intractable wars is less attractive for state leaders, 
as prospective benefits are less likely. IGOs are less selective, as their mandates often 
explicitly include their engagement as conflict managers. For example, the UN has an 
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obligation to act as a global conflict manager.7 Despite this, international organization 
might also possess better resources for dealing with such disputes.
While powerful states and IGOs are the most frequently appointed as conflict 
managers (Bercovitch, Schneider, 2000: 162), it remains unresolved which type of 
mediator is more successful. Some scholars find that the disputants favor media-
tion by hegemonic states rather than mediation by international organizations (Ibid.: 
153), and that efforts by a powerful mediator are more successful. Svensson (2007: 
229) contends that, although all types of mediators have a positive effect in terms 
of reaching agreements, powerful mediators outperform “pure mediators,” which 
include representatives of IGOs, NGOs, regional organizations, small and distant 
states, as well as private individuals. On the other hand, Slim (1992) argues that less 
powerful mediators, such as Algeria, Switzerland, and Austria, can profit from their 
strategic weakness. According to him, relatively weak states can be successful in 
mediation since they cannot credibly threaten either of the adversaries with the pos-
sibility of punitive action (Frazier, Dixon, 2006: 390–391). Bercovitch and DeRouen 
(2005: 108) support this result and argue that superpower mediation decreases the 
chance for success.
There are also mixed results concerning the involvement of international organiza-
tions. Bercovitch and Gartner (2006: 356) find that international organizations are bet-
ter able to deal with highly intense and intractable conflict, as they have more resources 
at their disposal. Additionally, DeRouen (2003: 251–260) finds that the UN mediates 
ethnic civil conflicts quite successfully. Frazier and Dixon (2006: 401) suggest that 
international government organizations (IGOs) are best at securing a negotiated set-
tlement, since multilateral actors not only provide legitimacy but are also more likely 
to create an environment conducive to conflict resolution. Conversely, Touval (1994: 
53–54) argues that international organizations are not destined to mediate. Using the 
United Nations (UN) as an example, she points to the lack of real power and leverage, 
as well as the membership structure of international organizations in making a coher-
ent mediation strategy less likely. She furthermore finds that the slow administrative 
machinery of organizations makes them inflexible. Other authors like Bercovitch and 
DeRouen (2005: 108), Bercovitch and Houston (1993: 317; 1996: 27) or Doyle and 
Sambanis (2000: 791) similarly paint a gloomy picture of UN-led mediation attempts. 
They nevertheless trace the UN’s poor record to unpromising selection effects, find-
ing that the organization is mostly mediating conflicts that are already very hard to 
resolve. Trying to end seemingly intractable wars is less attractive for state leaders as 
the chance to increase their own popularity through successful conflict management 
is rather dim in comparison to “easy” conflict. While international organization might 
“inherit” such conflicts from unsuccessful state mediators, they might also possess bet-
ter resources for dealing with such disputes.
7 However, we may expect regional organizations to behave differently. They are attached to 
a specific region and may have “vested interests” in certain conflicts, which might bias their activities 
(Elgstroem et al., 2003: 23). Further, they may act in order to prevent a conflict from destabilizing 
a region (Greig, Regan, 2008: 764). Gartner (2011), studying the duration of peace agreements medi-
ated by regional organizations, nevertheless argues that they are mainly selected as mediators in civil 
wars that are highly intractable.
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We believe that these contradictory results are largely due to the neglect of recog-
nizing the endogenous nature of the strategy choice of the mediator. Before warring 
parties agree to given mediation terms, they must first gauge which mediation tactics 
are in their interest, and decide on the profile of the mediator. If they do not want the 
mediation to succeed, they are more likely to agree on a conflict manager who is less 
likely to resort to powerful conflict management strategies. Nevertheless, the warring 
parties cannot perfectly anticipate the behavior of the mediator. This means that con-
flict managers who surprisingly opt for a decisive strategy might be more successful 
than those who intervene less intrusively.
H3: If a mediator or a team of mediators employs a decisive strategy, the chance 
of mediation success increases.
Once after accepting a mandate, one crucial task any careful mediator cannot avoid 
is the study of how the violence evolved and why possible previous conflict manage-
ments have failed. We expect that one of the key lessons will be the avoidance of in-
conclusive strategies (Bercovitch, DeRouen, 2004; DeRouen, Bercovtich, Pospieszna, 
2011). Clearly, the history of the previous events may deter mediator from offering 
conflict managements as well as the warring states from inviting new mediations. 
However, once mediation takes place after unsuccessful mediations, it is more likely 
that a decisive strategy will be used. In other words, if mediation attempts took place 
in the past and they failed, there is reason to believe that this experience may have 
taught the mediators to adopt a more decisive strategy. The agreement of the conflict 
parties to engage into a new mediation attempt also signals that they might be really 
interested in a peaceful resolution of the conflict. Finally, the more mediation attempts 
have failed, the more “ripe” a conflict is for peaceful resolution. Böhmelt (2015) finds 
empirical evidence for such turning points and also shows that mediation success in-
creases if the same mediators intervene over the course of a dispute.
H4: Previous mediation attempts increase the chance of decisive mediation strategies 
and of a successful outcome.
The rationalist theory of bargaining in wars can be adapted to mediations which are 
voluntary and where the disputants have a complete freedom to act. However, mediations 
can often not completely be separated from interventions in which the conflict managers 
self-appoint themselves to the pacifying task. One crucial characteristic of the selec-
tion process is therefore whether the belligerents approached the mediator themselves, 
or whether a mediator took the initiative. Our analysis differentiates accordingly who 
initiates the mediation attempt. We believe that, if one or both warring parties initiate 
a mediation attempt, they demonstrate the willingness for conflict resolution, thus mak-
ing mediation more likely successful. In exploring the link between mediation initiation 
and the effectiveness of conflict management, Greig (2001: 699) argues in this vein that 
mediation initiated by one of the rivals is more likely to be successful. “Even if this ex-
pectation develops within only one rival, the perception of a way out may foster greater 
flexibility in negotiations-improving the prospects for mediation success.”
As decisive strategies might risk to benefit one side more than the other, media-
tions initiated by the disputants should largely rely on communicative strategies. The 
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warring parties mandate third party intervention mainly for the provision of informa-
tion. This implies that mediator-initiated conflict management is more likely to re-
sort to decisive strategies. Yet, as the disputants often perceive outside interventions 
as coercion and are not “ready” for sincerely negotiating a peace agreement, they 
are more likely to resist conflict resolution proposals if they are made by an external 
source. The failed mediations of India in 1985 and 1986 in the civil war in neighbor-
ing Sri Lanka illustrate this tendency. We therefore argue that outside parties who 
initiated the mediation themselves are more likely to muster decisive strategies, but 
that this forcefulness does not translate into an increased chance of peace. We expect 
that mainly mediators who act on behalf of a state can muster the resources needed 
to employ directive strategies.
H5: States as initiators of a conflict management attempt are more likely to rely on 
decisive strategies, but face an increased risk of seeing their attempt ending in 
failure.
In directive strategies, the mediator must either promise a reward in exchange for 
the acceptance of a certain proposal, or threaten with punishments in case that they 
remain intransigent. Procedural strategies in return require considerable agenda setting 
possibilities. Not all mediators have the means to credibly commit to a potential agree-
ment that involves such enhanced leverage. In this scenario, states are in a better posi-
tion than international organizations, as they can unilaterally determine the extent of 
inducements and sanctions they want to offer. It thus seems reasonable to expect that 
states are more likely to use directive strategies during mediation than other conflict 
managers. Of course, rational warring parties will anticipate that states have a better 
chance to employ more decisive strategies than IGOs or independent mediators. This 
means that state-led mediations will not necessarily be more effective than the ones 
conducted by other mediators such as the United Nations or other international gov-
ernmental organizations.
A bias of a mediator towards one of the conflict parties can hamper the pacify-
ing role of the mediator as it will not necessarily provide accurate information to the 
disputants (Rauchhaus, 2006). Yet, mediators can only be biased if they have suf-
ficient leverage to set positive and negative incentives. Less powerful mediators tend 
therefore to be more neutral than more resourceful ones. Smaller powers, however, 
increase their influence on the disputants through teaming up with another mediator. 
We therefore expect that multilateral teams will be more successful in their attempts 
to bring peace to a violent conflict, but that they are not necessarily able to pull off 
decisive strategies.
H6: Multilateral interventions are more likely to lead to mediation success, although 
they are less likely to rely on decisive strategies.
States are in a better position than international organizations as they can decide 
alone about the incentives they want to offer. It thus seems reasonable to expect that 
states are more likely to use directive strategy during mediation than other conflict 
managers. As our theory suggests, rational warring parties will anticipate that states 
have a better chance to employ more directive strategies than IGOs or independent 
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mediators. The belligerents can, however, not anticipate whether the mediator entices 
them to negotiate their plight on its own territory. Such a transfer away from the con-
flict zone puts pressure, often under the limelight of international media, on the dispu-
tants to give in to a negotiated settlement.
The case study literature strongly suggests in this vein that it matters where me-
diation occurs. In examining the case of Camp David, Bercovitch (2011: 121) con-
tends that neutral settings where neither party has “any potential for territorial and 
psychological dominance” come with clear advantages over other locations (Ibid.). 
In an earlier study, he also finds that mediation attempts that take place in a peaceful 
environment can bring better results rather than attempts taking place in conflict ter-
ritory (Bercovitch, 1996). Of course, a neutral territory is not neutral in the sense that 
mediators are completely unbiased to the belligerents in the civil war. Yet, meeting in 
another country legitimized in an internal conflict the rebel forces which are often do 
not enjoy the same legitimacy as the government. Given this, we argue that mediation 
on the third-party territory is more likely to end with success.
H7: Mediation attempts that take place on the third party territory have an increased 
chance to be successful.
We theorize that the occurrence of mediation, the selection of a decisive strategy 
and the final outcome of the conflict management attempt are intertwined processes 
that should be studied together. In doing so, we acknowledge that mediation cases 
are neither a random sample of all militarized disputes nor of all militarized disputes 
that experience some sort of conflict management (Bercovitch, Gartner, 2009). If we 
were exclusively looking at mediation success, we would either under- or overestimate 
the relative success of this conflict management technique.
RESEARCH DESIGN
This study examines the success of mediation attempts as a stepwise process. As the 
theoretical framework stresses the importance of selection effects, we run Heckman 
probit models to explain the choice of mediation strategies and mediation success. The 
selection stage of the Heckman model considers whether or not a conflict experiences 
a conflict management or not. Heckman models are the most common approach to deal 
with selection issues, and have also been included in several studies of conflict man-
agement (Böhmelt, 2010).8 Terris and Maoz (2005) moreover address the selection 
problem by using several techniques to show that the “versatility” of a conflict affects 
the probability that it will experience mediation. The Heckman probit approach that 
we use to account for strategic censoring in our models (Heckman, 1974, 1976, 1979; 
Van de Ven, van Praag, 1981) is built on a number of assumptions, among them the 
exclusion restriction. We need, in accordance with this requirement, to include some 
regressors in the selection equation that do not make part of the second-stage estima-
8 Other applications include examinations of the effectiveness of sanctions (Nooruddin, 2002), 
the likelihood of negotiated dispute settlement (Dixon, Senese, 2002) and the escalation of disputes 
(Kinsella, Russett, 2002).
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tion. We will use in line with our theoretical framework all the conflict characteristics 
for this purpose. At the selection stage, we also control for the impact of democracy, 
war recurrence, the internationalization of the civil war, and alliance membership on 
the choice of mediation.
Dixon’s (1994, 1993) finds that democracies are more likely to agree on a peaceful 
resolution of interstate conflict and therein accept an outside management. This sug-
gests that political openness might also make these states more amenable to a peaceful 
resolution of the conflict. Similarly, mediators may be more likely to intervene if the 
state which has succumbed to a civil conflict is sufficiently democratic (Wallenstein et 
al., 2009). Yet, civil wars in democracies represent cases that are particularly difficult 
to resolve, often pitting presidents with a clear electoral mandate against rebel organi-
zations that represent large ethnic groups (Schneider, Wiesehomeier, 2008). This sug-
gests that the relationship between democracy and mediation is theoretically inconclu-
sive. It is therefore not surprising that DeRouen et al. (2011) have found no evidence 
that regime type, measured here by the Polity score at the end of the civil war episode 
plays a role in mediation.
Internationalization of war measures whether another country intervened militarily 
(coded as 1) or not. We can expect that military presence of the third country may both 
enhance the prospects of peace and encourage meditation. Following DeRouen et al. 
(2011), we expect that the number of previous conflicts is related to chance for media-
tion. Recurrence is coded 1 if at least one internal war terminated before, 0 otherwise. 
Membership of a conflict country in a military alliance should also reduce the chance 
of mediation. The analysis therefore controls with a dummy variable whether a state 
was a member of Military Alliance (such as NATO, Warsaw Pact, SCO, Arab League, 
and CSTO during the conflict).
We will use the Civil War Mediation (CWM) Dataset compiled by DeRouen et al. 
(2011), which draws on the UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset.9 The CWM dataset 
was published in two versions, one containing 319 civil war episodes and one contain-
ing 460 civil war mediation events (by states and other actors). As this analysis needs 
both specific information on the mediated events and information regarding the civil 
conflicts, the two versions of the CWM dataset were merged. The time period studied 
ranges from 1945 to 2004.
The dataset lists the names of mediators. We decided to group them into single-
party mediations and multiparty mediations (Table 1). We also distinguish whether the 
former category was led by a state or by an IGO. The descriptive evidence also shows 
that mediations by states which are powerful through their permanent membership in 
the United Nations Security Council occur quite frequently. Further, the frequencies in 
which states or international organizations act as mediators are quite balanced. The UN 
plays a dominant position among international organizations (almost 20% of all single 
mediation attempts assigned to IGOs are led by the UN). Three similar categories are 
built for the analysis of multiparty mediations. We distinguish between UN-led teams, 
multilateral initiatives uniting representatives of nation states and a mixed lineup of 
IGO and state mediators.
9 The UCDP/PRIO uses a threshold of at least 25 battle-related deaths to define civil war 
episode.
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Similarly, we can identify better multiparty mediations by specifying whether me-
diation was led by a group of different actors (e.g. different states, IGOs), or a group 
led by the UN, or by the group of different states.
Table 1
Mediation Occurrence by Mediator’s Identity
Freq. Percent Cum.
Single party mediation
Individual 15 4.70% 4.70%
IGOs 155
United Nations 62 19.44% 24.14%
Other IGOs 93 29.15% 53.29%
States 149
UN Security Council permanent members 45 14.11% 67.40%
Other states 104 32.60% 100.00%
Total 319 100.00%
Multiparty mediation
UN-led 33 25.38% 25.38%
Group of states 59 45.38% 70.77%
Mixed mediation 38
UN+EU mediation 14 10.77% 81.54%
Other mixed mediation 24 18.46% 100.00%
Total 130 100.00%
Source: Own calculations based on data collected.
The first dependent variable is whether mediation has been chosen as a conflict man-
agement strategy or not. Mediation Occurrence is 1 if the conflict parties agreed on 
mediation, and 0 if they did not. Note that the zero category includes decisions in favor 
of other conflict management strategies as well as those few disputes that did not expe-
rience any conflict management at all.
To test our hypotheses on the choice of mediation strategies, the dataset distin-
guishes, as indicated, three different types: Directive Strategy, Communication Fa-
cilitation Strategy, and Procedural Strategy. Since procedural and directive strategies 
are more active than the facilitation of communication, we will collapse them into the 
category Decisive Mediation Strategy with 1 standing for this choice and 0 for the 
absence of a forceful strategy.
In order to unravel the impact of mediator type and strategies on the effectiveness 
of the conflict management effort, we transform these individual categories into dum-
my variables. We coded Mediation Success in line with most research evaluating the 
effectiveness of short-term mediation, as 1 if a mediation attempt resulted in a partial 
settlement, full or process agreement, and as 0 otherwise.
The independent variables that account for the possible influence of the conflict 
structure on the steps of mediation include two indicators of conflict intensity: the log 
of the total Battle Deaths until the conflict managements sets in, and the log of War 
Duration, which stands for the length in days since the outbreak of the war. All data 
are from CWM mediation dataset. Some studies have found that the type of conflict 
the warring parties are fighting matters – territorial wars are more likely to be mediated 
but at the same time are less likely to end with peace agreements than governmental 
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wars. Yet, territorial wars tend to be longer, more intractable and to be more frequently 
recurring than militarized conflicts over government control. As we measure conflict 
intensity, our analysis will not control for the type of incompatibility. It is therefore in 
our view sufficient to examine the impact of conflict intensity on mediation.
Other structural factors relate to the characteristics of a conflict country. We used 
World Development Indicators to collect data for economic development, which is 
measured by the logged Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDP per capita) in 2004, 
and for a country size measured by Population in 2004.
The independent variables that describe mediation attempts were taken from the Civ-
il War Mediation dataset. From the variable in the dataset that refers to the location of 
mediation we created the dummy variable: Third-party Territory. We will also evaluate 
the result of mediation attempt solely initiated by mediator and thus created three dum-
my variables, a general one Mediator-initiated, to indicate that the incentive to mediate 
came from the mediator rather than from the warring parties. However, we also distin-
guished to see whether it matters for the mediation success who initiates, therefore we 
created another two dummies: State initiated mediation, if a state representative offered 
mediation as a conflict resolution tool, or IGO initiated mediation, when an organization 
stepped in to offer mediation. The variables are based on data in CWM dataset.
Finally, we introduce a variable that will allow us to account at least to some ex-
tent for the effect of previous mediations on the strategy choice and the success of the 
conflict management effort: Previous Mediation (1 if one or two mediation attempts 
occurred previously and 0 if no mediation was observed).
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS
This article conceives of mediation as a stepwise process in which belligerents accept 
an offer by a third party to end their dispute or chose mediation themselves as a means 
to solve a conflict. Once this crucial initial selection has been made, mediators rely on 
different strategies in order to boost the chance of their efforts ending successfully. Our 
testing strategy reflects this procedural nature of conflict management. We first exam-
ine jointly the criteria under which warring parties decide in favor of mediation and 
the conditions under which the chosen conflict managers opt for a decisive strategy. 
Second, we study the covariates of mediation success by controlling for the tendency 
of certain conflicts to “self-select” themselves into this form of conflict management. 
Our statistical tests are Heckman probit models.
Table 2 presents the conditions under which belligerents accept mediation as a pos-
sible conflict resolution mechanism and, given this decision, what strategies the con-
flict managers opted for. The standard errors are adjusted for clustering on dyads be-
tween the conflict parties. The Heckman probit models report that mediation as a form 
of conflict management is more likely in smaller countries. This indicates that the 
international community is able to “convince” internationally feeble belligerents to 
accept a mediation attempt. The impact of GDP per capita goes in the same direction, 
but is not statistically significant. These results cast some shadow on the proclamation 
that mediation is entirely a voluntary process.
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Table 2 further shows in line with our theoretical expectations that the longer 
the disputants have fought, the greater is the chance that the warring parties rely 
on an outside party to help resolving them their dispute. In contrast to a conflict’s 
duration, its intensity does not exert a systematic effect. Note that only one of the 
control variables, recurrence, exerts a systematic effect. The more often a dyad has 
experienced a conflict, the less likely it is that the warring parties will seek the help 
of a third-party.
Table 2
Determinants of Mediation Occurrence and Strategy (Heckman Probit Regressions)
(1) (2)
Decisive mediation strategy
UN-led –0.43
(0.30)
State-led 0.15
(0.29)
Multiparty mediation 0.11
(0.23)
0.24
(0.27)
Mediator-initiated 0.26
(0.22)
0.28
(0.22)
Previous mediation 1.37***
(0.28)
1.38***
(0.29)
Constant –0.89***
(0.20)
–1.06***
(0.23)
Mediation Occurrence
Population –0.12**
(0.06)
–0.12**
(0.06)
GDP per capita –0.13
(0.11)
–0.13
(0.11)
War Duration 0.31***
(0.05)
0.31***
(0.05)
Battle Deaths 0.05
(0.12)
0.05
(0.12)
Military Alliance –0.06
(0.29)
–0.06
(0.29)
Polity 0.03
(0.02)
0.03
(0.02)
Recurrence –0.41*
(0.22)
–0.42*
(0.21)
Internationalization 0.21
(0.32)
0.21
(0.32)
Constant –0.94
(0.84)
–0.95
(0.84)
N 581 581
N (censored) 207 207
N (uncensored) 374 374
Loglikelihood –469.94 –471.50
Rho 0.41
(0.31)
0.42
(0.26)
Chi2 (Rho) 1.66 1.96
Standard errors in parentheses: * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.005.
Source: Own calculations based on data collected.
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The analysis shows that characteristics of the conflict and the country suffering an 
internal war affect the chance of mediation. Mediation, in other words, does not occur 
randomly. Table 2 moreover shows in line with hypothesis 7 that the conflict history 
matters for the decision of the conflict manager to rely on a specific strategy. If there 
have been previous mediation attempts, the newly appointed conflict managers take 
this often as a carte blanche to employ a decisive mediation strategy. Although the 
signs for state-led and IGO-led mediations point in opposite directions, these influ-
ences are not statistically significant. We can therefore not say that states are per se 
more likely to adopt decisive strategies. Note, however, that especially the UN often 
steps in as conflict mediator when states have given up. The civil wars in El Salvador, 
Angola, and Mozambique where the United Nations were finally able to act as peace 
broker, illustrate the tendency that especially this central IGO often inherits the man-
date to mediate in “orphaned conflicts” from state representatives or other conflict 
managers whose efforts have failed. We also do not find definitive confirmation for 
the hypothesis that mediator-initiated conflict management attempts are more likely to 
experience clear and decisive strategies. Note, however, that this influence is in some 
specification that we include in the web appendix statistically significant.
The negative influence of UN-led mediations in Model 1 in Table 2 further con-
firms our rational expectation hypothesis, according to which conflict parties try to 
select mediators with limited ambitions. The United Nations frequently prefers to 
consult with the conflicting parties, especially if the conflict takes place in powerful 
states, and refrains from using clear mediation strategies. States used directive strate-
gies in 39 mediation attempts, procedural ones in 218, and communication facilitation 
in 56 conflicts. As expected, multi-party mediations do not rely on decisive strategies.
Under what conditions is mediation successful? The tests reported in Table 3 reveal 
that certain attributes of a mediator and the strategies used by the conflict manager can 
make a difference. The self-congratulatory statements that effective mediators often 
utter in the aftermath of a successful attempt to bring peace often hide that certain 
conflicts are easier to solve than other ones. Most importantly, the Heckman probit 
models reveal that a decisive strategy increases the chance of success. This finding cor-
responds with the literature on civil war termination that stresses the need for a more 
decisive third-party involvement than just getting the parties to the bargaining table 
(Walter, 2002). Additionally, while multiparty mediation is not linked to an increased 
chance that a mediator chooses a decisive strategy, multilateral third-party efforts 
render conflict management more effective. The Probit models reported in the Online 
Appendix show that UN-led and state-led mediations have a higher chance to be suc-
cessful. However, these estimations do not take the selection effects into account.
Putting the evidence of the various tests together, we find considerable support 
for the argument that we must take both the structure of the conflict and the mediator 
identity into consideration in order to understand the interlinked phases of media-
tion. Hypotheses 1 and 2, according to which the population size of a conflict coun-
try and the intensity of conflict matter for mediation occurrence again received quite 
solid empirical backing. While war duration positively affects the probability that 
a conflict is mediated more populous countries are less likely to experience conflict 
management.
 Dispute or Mediator? The Selection and Effectiveness of Conflict Management... 149
Table 3
Determinants of Mediation Occurrence and Success (Heckman Probit Regressions)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Mediation success
Decisive Strategy 0.36**
(0.18)
0.36**
(0.18)
UN-led 0.44
(0.31)
State-led –0.08
(0.19)
Multiparty mediation 0.34**
(0.15)
0.25
(0.17)
Third-party territory 0.09
(0.15)
0.12
(0.16)
0.19
(0.17)
0.17
(0.16)
State initiated mediation –0.38**
(0.15)
–0.44**
(0.17)
–0.44***
(0.16)
IGO initiated mediation –0.17
(0.23)
–0.24
(0.26)
–0.19
(0.25)
Previous mediation –0.07
(0.19)
0.002
(0.20)
0.01
(0.19)
0.03
(0.19)
Constant –0.13
(0.26)
0.004
(0.27)
0.12
(0.26)
0.20
(0.30)
Mediation occurrence
Population –0.13**
(0.05)
–0.13**
(0.05)
–0.13**
(0.05)
–0.13**
(0.05)
GDP per capita –0.15
(0.11)
–0.15
(0.11)
–0.15
(0.11)
–0.15
(0.11)
War Duration 0.29***
(0.05)
0.29***
(0.05)
0.29***
(0.05)
0.29***
(0.05)
Battle Deaths 0.06
(0.11)
0.06
(0.11)
0.06
(0.11)
0.06
(0.11)
Military Alliance –0.002
(0.30)
–0.03
(0.32)
–0.03
(0.32)
–0.03
(0.32)
Polity 0.03
(0.02)
0.03
(0.02)
0.03
(0.02)
0.02
(0.02)
Recurrence –0.25
(0.22)
–0.26
(0.22)
–0.27
(0.22)
–0.27
(0.22)
Internationalization 0.21
(0.36)
0.21
(0.36)
0.19
(0.38)
0.21
(0.37)
Constant –0.84
(0.76)
–0.85
(0.76)
–0.83
(0.77)
–0.84
(0.76)
N 488 488 488 488
N (censored) 207 207 207 207
N (uncensored) 281 281 281 281
Loglikelihood –446.23 –443.08 –442.26 –443.57
Rho –0.48
(0.21)
–0.52
(0.20)
–0.50
(0.21)
–0.50
(0.20)
Chi2 (Rho) 3.81* 4.56** 3.77* 4.20**
Standard errors in parentheses: * p<.1, ** p<.05, *** p<.005.
Source: Own calculations based on data collected.
Power, therefore, largely allows war-torn countries to shield themselves against conflict 
management. If warring parties decide nevertheless on mediation, they try to choose 
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mediators who will most likely see their efforts thwarted in the end. Yet, the warring 
parties often underestimate in line with our theoretical expectation the determination 
of the conflict manager. Our empirical tests provide in this vein ample evidence in fa-
vor of the expectation that the selection of forceful strategies makes a difference (H3). 
A decisive mediation strategy increases the chance of success even when we control 
for the step-wise nature of mediation in line with our theoretical framework. A telling 
example of a mediator who adopted a surprisingly forceful conflict management at-
tempt is the behavior of the African Union (AU), formerly known as the Organization 
of African Unity (OAU) in the civil conflict in Comoros. As a reaction to the worsen-
ing secessionist crisis in Anjouan and the failure of previous mediation efforts, the AU 
imposed economic sanctions and threatened military action against President Moha-
mad Bacar’s regime on the island Anjouan in 2002. The result of the outside pressure 
was a transition of entire the archipelago island nation to a confederation and a series 
of elections. However, when President Bacar refused to leave office in 2008, the AU 
was forced to intervene militarily to restore public order.
Moreover, we find support for the assumption that indicates it is better for a me-
diation attempt if it is not initiated by the mediator, be it a state or intergovernmental 
organization, but rather by the parties engaged in the dispute themselves (H4). The 
aforementioned Indian interventions in Sri Lanka were, according to Keethaponcalan 
(2001: 92), further doomed by the lack of “a genuine interest in making peace.”
We also find in line with our theoretical framework that mediations which are led 
by the multilateral team have an increased chance to be successful (H5). Successful 
multilateral mediation occurred in El Salvador (UN, Catholic Church, and the U.S.) at 
the beginning of 1990s, in Colombia from 1999 to 2002 (UN, Catholic Church, Cuba, 
France, and Switzerland) or the Central African Republic from 2001 to 2003 (UN, 
OAU, Bishop Paulin Pomodimo). However, there is no systematic effect of where 
the mediation attempt takes place (H6). Examples of successful mediations that took 
place on the territory of the mediator are the peace talks led by U.S. President Clinton 
to end Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Although these mediation attempts led to the Oslo 
Accords I and II in 1993 and 1995, the treaties did not stop the two sides to resume 
the fighting in the second half of the decade. This might indicate that moving the 
negotiations to a country outside of the conflict zone is seldom sufficient in bringing 
peace, but it also might be that such cases are the especially difficult ones to mediate 
successfully. Conflict managers finally who intervene in previously mediated conflicts 
are not more likely to convince the disputants to sign a peace agreement (H7). The 
Second Sudanese Civil War (1983–2005) for instance saw nine mediation attempts 
before a Comprehensive Peace Agreement was signed, and the conflicts in Cambodia, 
Azerbaijan, and Sri Lanka also only ended after successions of mediators had returned 
home empty-handed.
* * *
The success of third parties in their endeavor to negotiate a peaceful settlement to 
a militarized conflict can be explained in terms of a mixture of different factors, some 
of them relating to the conflict itself, some relate to the parties that engage in conflict, 
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and some relate to individual attributes of a mediator. Mediation is, in other words, not 
just an exogenous input, unaffected by the reality of a conflict. Nor is it a mechanism 
solely dependent on mediator characteristics, as we were led to think by the memoirs 
and reminiscences of successful conflict managers. Mediation both affects and reflects, 
to some extent, the conflict environment in which it takes place. In this article, we 
have advanced a theoretical framework inspired by the bargaining theory of war to 
combine the structural and the actor-centric perspective. We particularly argue that 
mediation characteristics are only able to increase the chance of a peaceful settlement 
if at least one of the belligerents underestimates the chance that the chosen mediator 
employs a decisive conflict management strategy. Mediators can, to put it differently, 
make a difference if the conflict parties them did not anticipate a forceful intervention 
when selecting the third party or when they are so war-weary after some unsuccessful 
mediations that they accept the intrusive moves by the third party.
The empirical evaluation supports this double conjecture that it is important not 
only who mediates, but under certain conditions also how this conflict manager medi-
ates. Hence, a decisive mediation strategy matters even if we control for the tendency 
that only wars with a particular profile experience this form of conflict management. If 
the conflict parties had perfectly predicted what strategy the selected mediator would 
employ, we could explain the effectiveness of a mediation attempt solely through at-
tributes of the conflict and the mediator.
The voluntary nature of conflict management has its limits through the tempta-
tion of both states and IGOs to press a mediation offer on the belligerents. However, 
as our theoretical framework suggests, such attempts are less successful (state initi-
ated mediations) or as successful (IGO initiated mediations) as completely voluntary 
conflict management attempts. We also find in some specifications that multiparty 
mediations are more effective, but we could not establish that either state- or UN-
led mediations make a difference. The article also provides evidence in line with 
our theoretical expectation that the structure of the conflict only self-selects certain 
armed conflicts into the usage of mediation. We particularly find in line with the 
structural perspective that the longer a dispute lasts, the more likely it is that media-
tion is adopted as a conflict management tool. However, the intensity of a conflicts 
in terms of battle deaths are not necessarily always more likely to be mediated than 
less violent ones.
Our paper also contributes to the recent literature on sequencing (Heldt, 2009). We 
particularly pay attention to the history of mediation within conflicts that experience 
repeated conflict management attempts. Disputants who move back to mediation are 
more inclined to move to a negotiated settlement because of the growing costs of con-
flict. Yet, they do so particularly if a directive strategy is applied.
We acknowledge that our dichotomous categorization of mediation strategies 
does not give full justice to the plethora of sophisticated tactics that conflict man-
agers use. The comparative evaluation of mediation could therefore profit from at-
tempts to code the incentives and disincentives mediators possess and employ in 
a more nuanced way. Comprehensive data might not only help the research commu-
nity, but could also provide policy makers with benchmarks of what kind of strategy 
works in what context.
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ABSTRACT
The literature on conflict management offers two explanations of why the effectiveness of third 
parties to settle militarized disputes differs. The structural research tradition focuses on conflict 
characteristics, while the individualist approaches highlight the background, skills and power 
of a mediator, as well as the mediation strategy. This article reconciles these two approaches, 
and examines especially the effectiveness of mediation strategies. Accounting for the selec-
tion of mediation and the success of mediation attempts, we use the CWM 1945–2004 dataset. 
The analysis demonstrates that mediators who were able to pursue a determined strategy face 
a higher chance of success.
 
Keywords: civil wars, civil war mediation, conflict resolution, mediation strategies
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RODZAJ KONFLIKTU CZY UMIEJĘTNOŚCI MEDIATORA? 
W POSZUKIWANIU CZYNNIKÓW WPŁYWAJĄCYCH NA SUKCES 
ROZWIĄZYWANIA KONFLIKTÓW WEWNĘTRZNYCH 
 
STRESZCZENIE
Literatura przedmiotu dotycząca działań mających na celu zapobieganie konfliktom oferuje 
dwa wyjaśnienia dlaczego ocena wpływu stron trzecich w zakresie zarządzania kryzysowe-
go i rozwiązywania konfliktów poprzez mediacje tak bardzo różni się. Pierwsze wyjaśnienie 
uzależnia pozytywny wynik mediacji w wojnach domowych od specyficznych cech konfliktu, 
natomiast drugie wyjaśnienie od umiejętności i doświadczenia mediatora oraz od strategii me-
diacji zastosowanych w procesie rozwiązywania konfliktu pomiędzy stronami. Celem badań 
jest ustalenie jakie czynniki w przedstawionych podejściach mają decydujący wpływ na to, że 
niektóre wysiłki mediatorów kończą się sukcesem a niektóre nie. Badania zostały przeprowa-
dzone na próbie 581 mediacji w wojnach domowych w latach 1945–2004 i potwierdziły nasze 
założenia dotyczące strategii mediacji. Analiza pokazuje, że mediatorzy, którzy przejmują ini-
cjatywę i sugerują rozwiązania (directive mediation strategies), odnoszą większy sukces w roz-
wiązaniu konfliktu niż mediatorzy którzy stosują mediacje facylitatywne.
 
Słowa kluczowe: wojny domowe, mediacje, rozwiązywanie konfliktów, rodzaje mediacji
